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Abstract 
 
In a recent paper, Haig and Borsboom explore the relevance of the theory of truth 
for psychological science. Although they conclude that correspondence theories of 
truth are best suited to offer the resources for making sense of scientific practice, 
they leave open the possibility that other theories might accomplish those same 
ends. I argue that deflationary theories of truth, which deny that there is any 
substantive property that unifies the class of truths, makes equally good sense of 
scientific practice as the correspondence theory, but at lesser theoretical cost. I also 
argue that the considerations Haig and Borsboom draw on are better thought of 
as issues relevant to realism, and thus separate from the theory of truth. I conclude 
that while they are correct to engage questions about what makes true the various 
claims that arise in psychological research, they may do so without saddling 
themselves with a correspondence theory. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In their recent exploration of the role for the theory of truth in understanding the nature 
of psychology (and science more generally), Haig and Borsboom defend the correspondence 
theory of truth by way of showcasing its ability to “make good sense of the many and different 
aspects of psychological research” (2012, p. 287). They are open to the possibility that other 
theories of truth—such as “deflationary” theories—might enjoy similar resources, and invite 
others to meet “the challenge of showing how non-correspondence theories of truth are relevant 
to psychology” (2012, p. 288). In this paper, I take up their challenge in the hopes of furthering 
our shared goal of understanding what relevance truth has for psychology. Though I do not contest 
their relatively modest core thesis—that “the correspondence theory of truth has the conceptual 
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resources to help psychologists understand important aspects of their science” (Borsboom & Haig, 
2013, p. 812)—I believe that other theories possess these same resources, but at lesser theoretical 
cost. Furthermore, I maintain that some of their arguments offered in favor of correspondence 
theory rely on phenomena that are better understood without reference to truth at all. What I aim 
to accomplish in this paper is an account of how truth does and doesn’t figure into some key ideas 
in psychological science, and what difference that makes regarding which theory of truth is correct. 
I begin by articulating some of the key theories in question, and then turn to reconstructing 
Haig and Borsboom’s various arguments in favor of correspondence theory. Then I highlight why 
those considerations don’t depend on adopting a correspondence theory of truth. What this 
reveals, I believe, is that deflationary theories of truth have a more economical way of explaining 
the role that truth plays in science. I conclude by suggesting that some of the motivations driving 
Haig and Borsboom actually concern metaphysical issues like realism, such that truth itself has less 
relevance than might initially be thought. 
 
2. Lay of the land 
 
Haig and Borsboom’s aim is to defend the correspondence theory of truth, which is widely 
thought to be the most commonsensical theory of truth. Although the theory is particularly 
vicissitudinous, having evolved in myriad ways over the last century, the core idea is 
straightforward (see Rasmussen (2014) for a recent thorough defense). When something like a 
sentence, belief, statement, or proposition (i.e., a “truth-bearer”) is true, it’s true in virtue of its 
standing in a correspondence relation to something in the world (namely, a “truthmaker”). Truth, 
for correspondence theorists, consists in the right kind of match obtaining between the world on 
the one hand, and representations of the world on the other. The task of correspondence theory 
is to give insightful accounts of what truth-bearers and truthmakers are, and what the nature is of 
the relation that stands between them. 
For example, one might explicate the idea of correspondence by espousing a theory that 
held that sentences are true when they express propositions that are isomorphic to an existing fact. 
Here is an example of how this theory and its key terms might be further spelled out: the English 
sentence ‘Snow is white’, like the German sentence ‘Schnee ist weiss’, expresses the proposition 
that snow is white. This proposition is a representational device composed, in part, by the concept 
of snow and the concept of whiteness. The proposition’s structure is isomorphic to the worldly 
fact of snow’s being white, which itself is some sort of compound object involving snow and the 
property of being white. Because the structure of the proposition and the structure of the fact 
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match, anything that expresses that proposition is true. Obviously, this example leaves out the 
details of exactly what propositions, facts, and isomorphism are (which are all contentious issues 
among philosophers); the challenge that philosophers sympathetic to the correspondence theory 
have been trying to meet for decades is giving illuminating accounts of each of these notions, and 
there is little consensus among them as to which accounts are best. Thankfully, these internal 
debates in the theory of truth are of no consequence to Haig and Borsboom’s arguments, which 
are meant to be deployable by any particular species of correspondence theorist. 
Over the course of their discussion, Haig and Borsboom mention a variety of opponents: 
coherentists, pragmatists, postmodernists, social constructivists, and deflationists. It’s paramount 
to keep in mind the distinctions between these views, as Haig and Borsboom’s criticisms do not 
apply to them equally. It’s most useful, given the structure of their defense, to divide the 
correspondence opposition into three camps. First are the coherentists and pragmatists. These 
views offer what philosophers call a “substantive” theory of truth, which—like the correspondence 
theory—provides a philosophically robust account of the nature of truth in terms of further 
notions (such as coherence, consensus, utility, etc.). These accounts are “robust” in the sense that 
they give a theory or definition of truth that provides a unified explanation for why something is 
true. If p and q are both true, that’s because they share the features that are required for truth, 
according to those theories. Most of Haig and Borsboom’s critical remarks apply to these two 
theories, and I am broadly sympathetic with their overall point of view. Second are the 
postmodernists and social constructivists, who don’t receive much attention except for a few stray 
remarks. I shall set them aside, as I’m unclear as to what sort of theories Haig and Borsboom have 
in mind, and have no present interest in defending them. 
Finally there are deflationary theories of truth (e.g., Horwich (1990)). Deflationary theories 
of truth adopt the perspective that the various “substantive” theories—correspondence, 
coherence, pragmatism—rest on a mistake. To understand truth, we do not need to offer up an 
elaborate theory of what it takes to be true. Instead, we need only give an account of how the truth 
predicate ‘is true’ functions in language. And that predicate is best understood as a tool that 
enhances and enables certain expressive capacities. Here is how Haig and Borsboom define 
deflationism: 
 
deflationary theories, which come in considerable variety, deny that there is a property of 
truth as such. Scholars who adhere to such theories argue that a substantive concept of 
truth is superfluous, and can be deleted from all discourse without loss of content. For 
deflationists, the predicate “is true” in a sentence merely performs the linguistic function 
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of assenting to a proposition, and it can be dispensed with, without loss of meaning. That 
is, “the proposition ‘general intelligence is neural plasticity’ is true,” for them, means exactly 
the same as the sentence “general intelligence is neural plasticity”; therefore, the notion of 
substantive truth is taken to be empty. (2012, p. 274) 
 
This characterization of deflationism is essentially correct, though there is a danger in 
misinterpreting what it means to say that truth is “empty” or “superfluous”, or that the property 
of truth doesn’t exist at all. (For further discussion of what “substantive” truth comes to, see 
Edwards (2013) and Asay (2014).) Deflationary theses, in fact, might initially sound like some of 
the claims that Haig and Borsboom have in mind when they mention social constructivism and 
postmodernism. The best way to present the deflationary theory of truth, one which will avoid 
these possible misunderstandings, is to show it in action. As I shall argue later on, adopting a 
deflationary stance on truth is consistent with maintaining that the aim and purpose of psychology 
is to discover and predict the truth about minds and behavior. The fact that truth need not be 
defined in terms of correspondence is no barrier to its being an essential component of our 
understanding of science. By showing how deflationists approach the various phenomena that 
Haig and Borsboom consider, I hope to both illuminate what deflationary theories of truth are, 
and demonstrate how they are, in various ways, superior accounts of truth when it comes to 
understanding the role that truth plays in science. 
 
3. Haig and Borsboom’s defense of correspondence 
 
Haig and Borsboom adopt the strategy of defending correspondence accounts by showing 
how they make good sense of psychological science. Their more modest conclusion is that 
correspondence theory provides adequate resources for explaining numerous important aspects in 
psychological science. This conclusion I do not dispute. However, they also defend a more 
ambitious conclusion, as when they contend that “it is essential, or at least desirable, to invoke the 
resources of a basic correspondence theory of truth in order to make good sense of the many and 
different aspects of psychological research” (2012, p. 287). My goal is to show that doing so is 
neither essential nor desirable. Haig and Borsboom are forthright in admitting that they haven’t 
fully established that correspondence theories are essential, as they are open to the possibility that 
other theories can accomplish the same theoretical labor. By detailing how deflationists can achieve 
these same ends at lesser theoretical cost, I hope to show that correspondence theory is less 
attractive than Haig and Borsboom suggest. 
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What are the aspects of psychological science that Haig and Borsboom turn to the theory 
of truth to explain? They assemble a broad collection of considerations, each of which, they argue, 
are best accounted for via correspondence: 
 
(i) characterizing fraud, 
(ii) distinguishing truth and justification, 
(iii) characterizing scientific criticism, 
(iv) identifying falsifiers, and 
(v) distinguishing the hierarchy of claims made within psychology. 
 
Without doubt, any theory of truth that failed to accomplish these five tasks is a failure. (Assuming, 
at least, that one accepts the hierarchy in (v), discussed below.) For example, any theory of truth 
that didn’t allow for theoretical claims to be falsifiable is a non-starter. Though at times Haig and 
Borsboom adopt a more ambitious form of their argument—“We maintain that a presupposition 
of correspondence truth is essential to a proper understanding of science” (2012, p. 273, emphasis 
mine)—I believe they should be read as ultimately arguing that correspondence theories 
outperform the opposition, not that correspondence theories are the only possible game in town 
(e.g., “it is open to pragmatists and postmodernists to give an alternative characterization of 
scientific fraud without making use of the correspondence of propositions to facts. We think, 
however, that […] such an account would be very difficult to substantiate” (2012, p. 281)). 
Given the clarity in Haig and Borsboom’s original presentation, there is no need for me to 
restate all the reasons they give for why correspondence theorists offer superior handlings of (i) 
through (v). (Many of these reasons will emerge when I discuss how the deflationist tackles them.) 
But here is one example that illustrates the tenor of their argument. After identifying what they 
call “procedural” claims in psychology (those that report on what occurred during research), they 
maintain that such claims are best understood as being true in the way of correspondence theory. 
So if a psychologist makes the claim that it’s true, say, that 52 undergraduates participated in a 
certain experiment, then 
 
This statement is not intended to cohere with other accepted statements, or to deliver a 
pragmatically useful object for use in one’s belief system, but to report a fact about the 
research. It is a statement that reports on how a part of the world is (or was, at the time of 
the research), and must be read in a correspondence sense. (2012, p. 280) 
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That is to say, when a researcher claims that 52 students participated in the experiment, the 
researcher is not making the claim that this is a useful thing to believe, or something that coheres 
with other things we believe (though both these claims may also be true), but that 52 students 
participated in the experiment. Basically, in reporting the details of what goes on during experiments, 
researchers are not making claims that have anything to do with us (such as facts about what’s 
useful for us to believe or what coheres well with what we already believe), but that are directly 
about the world. This focus on the world outside of our minds and beliefs is what makes 
correspondence truth so useful to science. 
Though I believe Haig and Borsboom underestimate the ability of competing theories to 
account for (i) through (v), I will not argue for that here. (See, e.g., Misak (1991) for a thorough 
defense of pragmatism.) Their critical remarks are mainly directed at coherence and pragmatist 
theories, and thus leave the prospects for deflationism untouched. I think that deflationary theories 
can achieve (i) through (v) in a simple and elegant way, and I aim to establish that in the next 
section. 
 
4. Deflationary truth and science 
 
As Haig and Borsboom note, there are multiple forms of deflationism about truth. Because 
the various intra-deflationary disputes need not concern us, I shall take the core of deflationism to 
be the following. First is the claim that most of our talk about truth serves a primarily expressive 
function. That is to say, when we introduce words like ‘truth’ and ‘true’ into our discussions, we 
are not introducing new content or substance into the conversation, but rather taking advantage 
of certain expressive conveniences. Second is the claim that there is no substantive property of 
truth, which must be understood in the following sense: though lots of sentences, beliefs, 
propositions, or what have you are true (and so in some trivial sense all possess the “property” of 
truth), they are not true in virtue of some single, shared feature that applies to all and only truths. 
Truths are true because of whatever it is they’re about, not because they share some unique, 
identifiable property with other truths. (By contrast, consider how all samples of water are samples 
of water in virtue of a shared chemical structure.) This characterization of deflationism will, I hope, 
become clearer as I show how deflationists approach the topics broached by Haig and Borsboom. 
Before addressing (i) through (v), however, let me illustrate some of the more basic features 
of the deflationary perspective. Suppose I assert that the first sentence of Haig and Borsboom’s 
“Truth, Science, and Psychology” is true. Deflationists stress that what I’m doing here is indirectly 
asserting the same thing that Haig and Borsboom directly assert in their paper, namely, that many 
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scholars have taken the idea of truth and its place in life to be of major importance (2012, p. 272). 
(Truth is thus “disquotational”: if ‘p’ is true I can infer that p.) Similarly, suppose I remark to a 
friend “Your birthday is coming up next week” and she responds “That’s true”. Here she expresses 
agreement with my assertion because her expression, by way of ‘true’, carries the same content as 
mine. We have both made the same claim, namely, that her birthday is coming up next week, 
though we used different words to do so. She could have expressed agreement with me by saying 
“My birthday is coming up next week”, but the presence of ‘true’ in our language gives us a simpler 
and less redundant way of doing so. This is an example of what I mean by saying that ‘true’ offers 
expressive conveniences, and does not introduce new content. 
The expressive functions of ‘true’ are in some cases not just convenient, but indispensable, 
practically speaking. Suppose I believe some, but not necessarily all of Pinker’s claims in The 
Language Instinct (1994). I can express my assessment by saying “At least one sentence in The 
Language Instinct is true”. How would I express myself without using ‘true’ (or any of its synonyms)? 
I would need to express each claim in The Language Instinct as a giant disjunction: 
 
Either Pinker has never met a person who is not interested in language, or Pinker wrote 
The Language Instinct to try to satisfy that curiosity, or language is beginning to submit to 
that uniquely satisfying kind of understanding that we call science, but the news has been 
kept a secret, or…  
 
Doing so, of course, is incredibly tedious and time-consuming. Hence, having a truth predicate 
around is of enormous expressive utility. 
One way to understand the deflationary thesis is that expressions involving truth are not 
independently meaningful—they are anaphora that inherit their meaning from the things to which 
truth is ascribed (much as how the meaning of pronouns is parasitic on antecedent noun phrases). 
To know the meaning of ‘What Charlie said is true’, we need to know what Charlie said. Likewise, 
for deflationists, sentences that employ ‘true’ don’t “add” any content on top of that to which 
truth is being ascribed: ‘It’s true that Wundt was German’, ‘‘Wundt was German’ is true’, and 
‘Wundt was German’ all, more or less, say the same thing. If that is the case, then the deflationists’ 
denial that different truths enjoy their truth in virtue of a single shared property becomes quite 
plausible. If the sentence ‘Infants do not develop object permanence before eight months of age’ 
is true, it’s true because infants do not develop object permanence before eight months of age. If 
the sentence ‘Humans possess an innate, genetically determined faculty for language’ is true, it’s 
true because humans possess an innate, genetically determined faculty for language. Most 
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deflationists concede that there is a very weak sense in which these two sentences “share” the 
property of truth: they’re both true (e.g., Horwich, 1990, p. 38). But the sense in which these two 
sentences “share the property of truth” is quite different from how substantivists see the matter, 
and quite different from how they share other genuine properties, such as being in English and being 
examples in an academic paper.  
 
4.1. Fraud 
 
I now make the case for why deflationists can handle Haig and Borsboom’s five desiderata 
without difficulty. First is the characterization of fraud. They understand accusations of fraud as 
the “denial of correspondence truth at the procedural or data level” (2012, p. 286). The procedural 
and data levels to which they refer are, in effect, the claims relevant to science that report on the 
basic goings-on of experiments and the data collected. (These are distinguished from more 
theoretically-loaded generalizations, causal claims, explanatory hypotheses, and others.) Examples 
of procedural- and data-level claims are, respectively, ‘The experiment subjected 50 cotton-top 
tamarins to stimulus s’ and ‘80% of the cotton-top tamarins subjected to stimulus s exhibited 
behavior pattern p’. Claims of fraud are directed only at claims such as these, as it’s inappropriate, 
for example, to charge someone with fraud only for offering an explanation of the data with which 
one disagrees. Reasonable minds might disagree on the causal explanation for some observed 
regularity; reporting the facts incorrectly regarding the raw data, however, introduces the possibility 
of fraud. 
The deflationist’s account of fraud maintains that the theory of truth, in this instance, is 
idle. That is to say, we can account for what fraud consists in without talking about truth at all. 
(Or, if we do use truth to define fraud, we’re just using truth for its usual expressive convenience.) 
Suppose I accuse Professor Cheat of fraud with respect to the following sentence from his 
published study: ‘80% of the cotton-top tamarins in the study exhibited behavior pattern p 
following stimulus s’. What I’m doing is claiming that Professor Cheat is, with intention to deceive, 
asserting that 80% of the cotton-top tamarins in the study exhibited behavior pattern p following 
stimulus s when he knows full well that it’s not the case that 80% of the cotton-top tamarins in the 
study exhibited behavior pattern p following stimulus s. We could describe Cheat’s behavior in 
terms of truth: he commits fraud by knowingly presenting a falsehood regarding his data and 
methods as truth. But in so doing, we’re just saying that he asserts that p when he knows that not-
p. Hence, we don’t need to bring in talk of correspondence truth to understand what fraud is, as Haig 
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and Borsboom do. Truth alone suffices, and truth itself in this instance is just an abbreviation for 
the content of the actual claims at issue. 
 
4.2. Justification 
 
Next we come to the distinction between justification and truth. As Haig and Borsboom 
point out, distinguishing these two concepts is paramount in science. One need only look to the 
history of science to find ample grounds for distinguishing the two. For example, Newton was 
well justified in his beliefs in his physical theories, though we now know them to be false.  
The deflationist has no difficulty in accounting for the distinction between truth and 
justification. What it is for ‘Infants do not develop object permanence before eight months of age’ 
to be true is for infants not to develop object permanence before eight months of age; what it is 
to be justified in believing the sentence is to have good grounds and reasons for believing that 
infants do not develop object permanence before eight months of age. Furthermore, it’s possible 
that one could have good reason for believing that infants do not develop object permanence 
before eight months of age, even if infants do develop object permanence before eight months of 
age—the evidence might have been misleading or misinterpreted, for instance. For the deflationist, 
what we mean when we say that justification and truth are distinct is that one could have good 
reason for believing that p even though it’s not the case that p. Again, the notion of correspondence 
need not be invoked. 
 
4.3. Scientific criticism 
 
Next we come to the need to characterize the nature of scientific criticism. Once again, 
Haig and Borsboom argue that correspondence truth enables us to understand what goes on 
during scientific criticism. They imagine an example in which a researcher objects to a claim you 
made in a paper: 
 
your colleague, Professor Brainsweat thinks that your explanation is flawed and writes a 
paper expressing his criticisms. In particular, he questions an assumption, A, that you 
made, say, that the property in question arose in response to certain environmental 
pressures that shaped selection. Brainsweat thinks that these environmental pressures did 
not exist, and he writes a critical commentary on your paper to argue his point. (2012, p. 
279) 
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What we have here is disagreement over whether or not certain environmental pressures existed 
at a certain time and place. Haig and Borsboom sensibly point out that Brainsweat’s fundamental 
goal in presenting his objections is not to doubt whether the existence of such pressures coheres 
with someone’s worldview, or whether future scientists will come to a consensus on their existence. 
What he is doing, they say, is claiming “that the environmental pressures mentioned in A did not 
exist so that there are no facts to function as truthmakers for your potential truthbearer A” (2012, 
p. 279; cf. Borsboom and Haig, 2013, p. 814). 
I believe, however, that Haig and Borsboom are still overanalyzing Brainsweat’s action. In 
claiming that the environmental pressures under dispute did not exist, he’s claiming that they did 
not exist: no more, and no less. Brainsweat might accept the implication that, therefore, there are 
no facts to serve as truthmakers for the claim made in the original paper—but only if Brainsweat 
is a committed correspondence theorist, which is no part of the setup to the hypothetical example. 
When Brainsweat asserts that assumption A is false, he’s asserting that it’s not the case that the 
property in question arose due to the environmental pressures; he thinks it’s false that those 
pressures existed, and so they can’t have caused anything. Haig and Borsboom are correct to 
maintain that Brainsweat is objecting to the existence of the pressures themselves, and not anything 
to do with the belief systems of current and future researchers. But that is precisely what the 
deflationist would say about the case. When Brainsweat claims that the sentence ‘Certain 
environmental pressures caused the appearance of certain properties in human beings’ is false, he’s 
denying that certain environmental pressures caused the appearance of certain properties in human 
beings. When we criticize someone’s claim as not being true, we are criticizing the claim itself, and 
not tangential claims about various systems of belief. That insight, I believe, is what Haig and 
Borsboom are hoping to express. It’s an insight, however, that is best explained by deflationism. 
When we challenge the truth of each other’s assertions, we are challenging the assertions 
themselves, not some property they may or may not have. 
 
4.4. Falsifiers 
 
The fourth feature of scientific practice of interest to Haig and Borsboom is the 
identification of falsifiers. It’s crucial, in doing respectable science, to think about not only what 
would confirm the truth of a theory, but also what would serve to falsify it. Correspondence truth, 
they claim, makes sense of this feature of science: 
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a correspondence reading of propositions makes clear not only what the researcher is 
assuming, but also what possible refuting material would look like. That is, a 
correspondence reading of theories immediately generates possible falsifiers for the theory. 
This is an important function in scientific discourse that, ironically, theories about 
discourse, such as postmodernism, cannot explain, because they typically deny any 
function for correspondence. (2012, p. 279) 
 
Haig and Borsboom may be correct that postmodernists cannot make sense of falsification, but I 
disagree with the implication that commitment to correspondence is necessary for articulating 
possible falsifiers. To see what falsifies a claim, we don’t need to give a “correspondence reading” 
of it; we just need to read it. 
Suppose a Chomskian defends the claim that all humans possess the ability to learn 
languages with recursion. This claim is a universal generalization, which means that it applies a 
property (possession of the ability to learn languages with recursion) to each member of the 
specified set (humans). To falsify the claim, one simply needs to identify a human being who does 
not possess the ability to learn a language with recursion. If a developmental psychologist claims 
that no infant develops object permanence before eight months of age, then the kind of 
counterexample needed is immediately apparent: produce an infant with object permanence who 
is younger than eight months old, and the claim has been falsified. These cases are quite simple. 
It’s less clear how to falsify, say, the claim that smoking causes lung cancer. Smoking does cause 
lung cancer, but this claim is not refuted by the existence of individual smokers who happen not 
to develop lung cancer. The conclusion to draw from this example is only that ‘Smoking causes 
lung cancer’ does not mean the same thing as ‘Everyone who smokes develops lung cancer’. The 
meaning of the latter claim is straightforward, and easily falsified. The former is not so 
straightforward, which is why there is enormous dispute within the philosophy of science as to 
how to interpret causal claims. Such disputes, however, are not settled by adopting a 
correspondence theory of truth. They’re settled by articulating and defending a theory about the 
nature of causation. So again, the theory of truth doesn’t have any obvious role to play in generating 
falsifiers for theories. As long as we understand the meaning of those theories, we can identify 
what sorts of observations would entail their falsity. We need to attend to the content of the claims 
themselves to discover what would falsify them, and attending to the content of the claims 
themselves is exactly what deflationists think we’re doing when we evaluate the truth and falsity of 
our utterances. 
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4.5. Hierarchy 
 
Finally we come to the hierarchy of claims made within psychological science. Haig and 
Borsboom present the claims made by psychological science as belonging to a four-tiered 
hierarchy. First come procedural claims, which are basic reports of what goes on in research: that 
50 cotton-top tamarins were exposed to stimulus s, say. Second is the data level, acceptance of 
which involves not the interpretation of the data, “but merely the acceptance of the data 
themselves” (2012, p. 281). When psychologists assert that 80% of those cotton-top tamarins 
behaved in a certain way in response to the given stimulus, they are making a claim that belongs 
to the data level. The third level, the phenomenal, introduces theoretical interpretations and/or 
extrapolations of the data. For example, the researchers might claim that 80% of the broader 
population of cotton-top tamarins would respond in a certain way were they provided the relevant 
stimulus. Finally there is the causal level, where claims are made regarding the causes of the 
phenomena expressed at the previous level. For instance, perhaps it is a certain kind of intelligence 
in the tamarins that causes them to behave as they do. 
Haig and Borsboom make a number of useful and interesting observations regarding the 
hierarchy. For one, they use it to differentiate between fraud and other forms of criticism. When 
Professor Cheat says something I take to be false at the phenomenal or causal levels, it would be 
inappropriate to charge him with fraud. He may have insufficient data to support his ampliative 
inferences, or may have put forward an implausible explanation of his results. He might be a poor 
reasoner or a bad theorist, but he is not yet a fraud. But if Cheat puts forward false claims at the 
procedural or data level, he’s guilty of fraud (if he acts with the intention to deceive) or negligence 
(if his falsehoods are unintentional). Secondly, Haig and Borsboom go into some detail regarding 
how the claims at different levels of the hierarchy may have substantially different truthmakers. 
For example, unobservable entities and processes might be posited in order to make true various 
causal claims, whereas the truthmakers for procedural-level claims might just involve readily 
observable empirical events and states of affairs. 
I take no stand as to whether Haig and Boorsboom’s hierarchy is ultimately the best way 
of organizing the structure of psychological theories. Their only claim about the hierarchy that is 
pertinent to my aim is their contention that “the correspondence theory is much more useful than 
any of its competitors […] in outlining the hierarchical and complex structure of facts presumed 
in high-level causal theories” (2012, p. 287). In response, first I would point out that my own 
presentation of the hierarchy was done entirely without reference to truth, let alone 
correspondence truth. One can divide the claims of psychological science into the four categories 
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without supposing that the different claims enjoy different kinds of correspondence. What 
separates the various claims are their content—what they are about. 
But there is something else that Haig and Borsboom wish to account for, and that is how 
the truthmakers for the claims seem to probe deeper and deeper into the structure of the world as 
we climb the hierarchy. For instance, the procedural level “makes no serious claims about a basic 
structure of reality” (2012, p. 280), whereas phenomenal claims can make “an ontological 
commitment to the structure of the world” (2012, p. 283), and causal claims even make 
commitments to how the world would have been had certain counterfactual conditions obtained. I 
take it that Haig and Borsboom see it as a virtue of their account that as the truths of psychological 
science ascend the hierarchy, so too does the complexity of their truthmakers. To this I reply that 
the deflationist about truth need not dispute anything that Haig and Borsboom claim regarding 
the different kinds of truthmakers for different kinds of scientific claims. It’s no surprise that as 
researchers make claims about deeper and more fundamental levels of reality, their claims are in 
turn made true by deeper and more fundamental parts of reality. After all, that reality is what those 
claims are about. 
Now, this reply might seem unavailable. How can the deflationist agree with the 
correspondence theorist as to what makes these various claims true? How can deflationists talk 
about truthmaking at all? This worry, it seems to me, rests on a misunderstanding of the 
deflationary theory of truth. (And one which, I believe, even some deflationists harbor.) It’s no 
thesis of deflationism that truths don’t have truthmakers. Deflationists need not deny that when 
something is true, it’s true in virtue of what’s going on in the world. Take the sentence ‘Obama 
exists’. A deflationist would point out that ‘Obama exists’ is true because Obama exists. Had 
Obama not existed, the sentence ‘Obama exists’ wouldn’t have been true. But to concede this 
simple point is not in and of itself to adopt a correspondence theory of truth, and its commitment 
to a complex theory of correspondence relations, facts, and the like. Deflationists deny that we 
need a robust commitment to a substantive property of truth to provide a uniform explanation as 
to why ‘Obama exists’ and all other truths are true. A deflationist should say that the right 
ontological commitment involved in accepting the truth of ‘Obama exists’ is just to Obama 
himself, and not to a correspondence relation or set of entities called ‘facts’. David Lewis, for 
instance, argues that “the Truthmaker Principle coexists peacefully with the deflationary 
conception of truth” (2001b, p. 605), and argues quite forcefully against correspondence theories 
(2001a). When it comes to, say, the proposition that there is a cat, Lewis observes: “It is true 
because it has a truthmaker. And what are its truthmakers? Cats. So it is true because there is a 
cat” (2003, pp. 28-29). 
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Employing the language of truthmaking is not in and of itself to adopt the correspondence 
theory of truth. As I see things, the correspondence theory (like the other substantive theories) 
offers its theory of truth by way of offering a theory of truthmakers. Correspondence theorists 
look to “worldly facts”, whereas coherence theorists turn to relations between propositions, and 
pragmatists look to the beliefs of future researchers within an ideal “final” science. Deflationists, 
by contrast, stay silent on the matter. A deflationist doesn’t tell you what makes a claim true, at 
least beyond the near-trivial claim that it’s true that p because p. It’s not up to the truth theorists, 
as it were, to tell you what the truthmakers are for claims about psychological science—that’s the 
task of psychologists (perhaps in tandem with philosophers of psychology). Likewise, it’s not the 
job of truth theorists to give accounts of what makes theories in physics or chemistry true; that 
should be left to physicists and chemists. From a deflationary point of view, the story about truth 
is very simple. Any claim that p is true if and only if p. But the story of what makes those truths 
true is an elaborate one that involves digging into whatever science it is that is tasked with 
discovering and understanding them (cf. Simons, 1992, p. 175). 
 
5. Truth and realism 
 
At one point in their discussion, Haig and Borsboom note the connection between their 
interest in the correspondence theory of truth and scientific realism: 
 
it should be noted that correspondence truth and metaphysical realism are natural allies, 
for facts are naturally understood as mind-independent parts of reality, and it is facts that 
make truthbearers’ correspondence true. We ourselves subscribe both to correspondence 
truth and metaphysical realism and, furthermore, we take these as two aspects of our 
broader commitment to scientific realism, which is the philosophy of science we 
presuppose in the following discussion of truth and scientific practice. (2012, p. 279) 
 
One way to interpret my remarks on the deflationary theory of truth is that it reveals that the work 
that needs to be done to make sense of the practice of psychological science is actually being 
performed by Haig and Borsboom’s commitment to realism, not their commitment to 
correspondence. The basic idea behind realism is that the world—or much of it, anyway—exists 
independently of the way we think about it. It’s true that bonobos would have had the capacity to 
communicate with signs, even if we had never discovered that fact about them. It would be true 
even had we (wrongly) believed otherwise. For realists, there can be facts regarding matters for 
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which we will never have any evidence, and that we may not have ever even contemplated. For 
example, I presume that (until just now) no one has ever entertained the question as to how many 
dinosaurs slept more than eight and a half hours during the 24 hour period beginning exactly 68 
million years prior to 11:25 p.m. Greenwich Mean Time, October 24, 2016. Presumably, there is a 
fact of the matter as to how many there were, though of course no one could ever find out. (Those 
equipped with time machines would hopefully dedicate their resources to more pressing matters.) 
My contention is that realism plays a much larger role in understanding the practice of science as 
understood by Haig and Borsboom than does correspondence. Thus, the reason deflationists have 
no trouble meeting the desiderata laid out by Haig and Borsboom is that deflationism is no barrier 
to realism, which is a point they acknowledge (2012, p. 278). 
That Haig and Borsboom’s true interest lies in realism surfaces, for example, when they 
write: “This underscores exactly the point of correspondence truth: the truthmaker is a relevant 
part of the world, rather than of the researcher” (2012, p. 281). It’s the nature of the truthmaker 
that matters—not how that truthmaker may or may not fit into some theory of truth. The sort of 
view that Haig and Borsboom recommend against is one that sets aside “the world” and focuses 
instead on the researcher. What they rightly contest is that the truths discovered by science are 
made true by matters that are fundamentally dependent upon the minds, beliefs, and judgments of 
researchers. One way to think about coherence and pragmatic theories of truth is that they locate 
the truthmakers of truth with the mind-dependent. For coherentism, the truth of your beliefs is a 
function of what other beliefs you have. For pragmatism, the truth of your beliefs is a function of 
what’s useful for you, or of what other people will believe at some future stage of scientific inquiry. 
What drives Haig and Borsboom’s criticisms of these non-correspondence theories of truth, I 
believe, is this background mind-independent metaphysical view that they employ. What science 
aims to discover, on their view, is the truth about an objective, shared world that exists largely 
independently of the minds that think about it, and that task is harder to square with a coherence 
and pragmatic theories of truth. 
What I would contend—and I believe Haig and Borsboom would concur—is that most 
psychological science (and most science, period) operates against a backdrop of metaphysical 
realism. There is a world that exists as it does largely independent of us and our interests, and that 
is fruitfully studied and explored by empirical scientific methods. I believe that their concern to 
defend the correspondence theory of truth largely relies on their intent to defend the role of this 
metaphysical picture in science. However, I do not think that advocating correspondence is the 
right response, and I shall close with a few remarks that begin to say why. 
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First, to embrace the correspondence theory of truth is not yet to embrace a realist 
metaphysical worldview. Haig and Borsboom make this point themselves, when they note that “At 
some strain, one could be a correspondence theorist and an idealist, as was J. E. M. McTaggart” 
(2012, p. 278). What this admission reveals is that one could adopt a correspondence theory of 
truth, but go on to maintain that the corresponding objects are all mind-dependent entities. (Think 
of Berkeley’s (1998) infamous worldview that reality is exhausted by minds and their ideas; the 
very idea of mind-independent matter, he argued, was incoherent.) As I would put the point, the 
longstanding friendship between correspondence theories of truth and metaphysical realism is 
sociological, not logical. There is no logical guarantee that with correspondence comes realism, 
though traditionally, as a matter of contingent fact, these theories have been defended hand in 
hand. So if it’s realism that one is after, there’s no logical compulsion to be a correspondence 
theorist. 
Second, because deflationism can be paired with realism just as well as correspondence 
can, Haig and Borsboom’s five desiderata actually point toward the former, which offers a 
theoretically simpler account of truth. This paper is not the place to offer a comprehensive account 
of the advantages of deflationism over correspondence (for that see Horwich (1990)), but a few 
points are worth mentioning. First, by taking on a correspondence theory of truth, one immediately 
commits to there being a truthmaker for every truth. If truth is constituted by the having of a 
truthmaker, then it’s impossible for there to be truths with no truthmaker. However, there is 
considerable dispute over whether all truths have or need truthmakers (see, e.g., Lewis (2001)). In 
his critical discussion of Haig and Borsboom, Markus (2013) lands on a few of the familiar problem 
areas, such as the case of logical truths. Does there need to be something in the world that makes 
it true that two plus two is four? One might think otherwise. Or consider ‘Psychology is the science 
of mind and behavior’. Such “truths by definition” might be thought not to owe their truth to 
what’s going on in the world, as do, say, contingent claims such as ‘B. F. Skinner practiced 
psychology’. That sentence couldn’t have been true without reality being a particular way, and 
including certain entities (namely, Skinner himself). It makes little sense, by contrast, to speak of 
the world being such that psychology wasn’t the science of mind and behavior. There might never 
have been psychologists, and the word ‘psychology’ might have ended up meaning something 
entirely different, but those are separate matters. Other examples include “negative existentials” 
such as ‘There are no speaking apes’ (or, equivalently, ‘All apes are non-speaking’). Even if there 
are facts to make it individually true of each ape that he or she doesn’t speak, we would need some 
further “and those are all the apes” fact to support the general claim, but it’s unclear what such a 
thing would be. (See Molnar (2000) for a discussion of this issue.) 
 17 
 
To say that deflationism enjoys a number of advantages over correspondence theory is not 
to say, of course, that deflationism has no problems of its own. Some uses of ‘true’, for instance, 
are not amenable to standard deflationist analyses. The sentence ‘To assert a proposition is to 
present it as true’, for example, uses ‘true’ in a way such that it cannot be removed without loss 
(Simmons, 2006, 203). Others have argued that once truth is deflated, its connection to other 
important concepts like linguistic meaning are lost (e.g., Bar-On, Horwich, and Lycan (2001)). (For 
a number of other objections to deflationism, see the thoroughgoing critical accounts offered in 
David (1994) and Künne (2003).) Note, however, that these criticisms of deflationism don’t have 
any obvious bearing on the matters of interest to Haig and Borsboom. So these objections don’t 
reveal that deflationism is any less capable of accounting for the practice of psychological science 
than is correspondence theory. Hence, even if deflationism has problems of its own, it’s still a 
more desirable theory of truth for psychology than correspondence. (Ultimately, I recommend a 
theory of truth that avoids the excesses of both correspondence and full-throttle deflationism; see 
Asay (2013a).) 
I commend Haig and Borsboom for their recognition of the importance of thinking about 
what makes true the various kinds of claims made within psychological science. Their approach to 
their hierarchy is laudable, at least insofar as it encourages theorists to think about what sorts of 
ontological posits are needed to ground the different sorts of truths that are asserted in the course 
of scientific research. Their observation that very different truths in psychology require very 
different truthmakers is an important one, and one that I believe is a more natural fit with a 
deflationary theory of truth. Again, the deflationary perspective is that truths themselves aren’t all 
that uniform—they don’t admit of a uniform explanation, as is required by correspondence 
theories. Individual truths are concerned with their own individual subject matter, and what 
truthmaker they have (if any) is a matter that must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Haig and 
Borsboom’s instinct to seek after the ontological grounds (i.e., truthmakers) of psychological 
theories is the right one, though there are advantages to divorcing it from the correspondence 
theory of truth. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
At the end of the day, in some respects my proposal isn’t all that different in substance 
from Haig and Borsboom’s. They pair their commitment to realism with a correspondence theory 
of truth (that employs “realist” truthmakers), whereas I am suggesting, on their behalf, a 
commitment to realism (in the form of objective, judgment-independent truthmakers) paired with 
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a deflationary theory of truth. Ontologically speaking, the two views will largely agree; that is to say, 
they may share a similar worldview, in terms of what exists, and what the structure of the world is 
like. (They will likely differ when it comes to certain details; for example, the correspondence 
theorist may need to posit additional entities to make true definitional and negative truths.) But I 
think the deflationist has the proper understanding of what role truth plays in that worldview. 
Science aims at discovering objective truth—that is something to which Haig and Borsboom and 
I can agree. However, that does not mean that there has to be a substantive property of truth that 
unifies the class of truths, as the correspondence theory maintains. Deflationism stresses that we 
don’t need to worry about a special property truth, we just need to concern ourselves with individual 
truths. 
As for Haig and Borsboom’s commitment to realism, a parallel question arises: does 
psychology really need a commitment to realism, or would a more modest philosophy of science 
suffice? This paper is not the place to take up that matter in full, but it’s worth noting that there 
are philosophers who argue that science can get by with less than full-blown realism, just as I’ve 
argued it can get by with less than correspondence: Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism 
(1980) and Arthur Fine’s “natural ontological attitude” (1984) are two prominent examples. I am 
highly critical of these approaches to the topic of scientific realism (see Asay (2013b)), but they do 
offer alternatives to scientific realism that do not go down the road of postmodernism and social 
constructivism that Haig and Borsboom are keen to reject. I invite Haig and Borsboom, as well as 
those who share their general outlook, to consider whether one of these alternative perspectives 
might also provide an adequate metaphysical basis for psychological theorizing. 
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